Plan Shikar: The Buried Blueprint That Turbocharged the Indian Air Force

When military historians examine the transformation of the Indian Air Force from a modest colonial auxiliary into a formidable subcontinental force within a decade of Independence, they invariably focus on the visible markers of this evolution. The acquisition of iconic aircraft such as the de Havilland Vampire, English Electric Canberra, Dassault Ouragan, and Hawker Hunter typically dominates the narrative, alongside celebrated operations like the Indo-Pak War of 1947 and Operation Polo in Hyderabad.

What remains conspicuously absent from these analyses is the invisible architecture that enabled this transformation. The operational frameworks, command structures, deployment strategies, radar networks, and establishment charts that provided the foundation for modern Indian air power were largely codified in a single, now-forgotten document: Plan Shikar.

The Unfinished War

The Kashmir conflict of 1947-48 may have concluded with a UN-brokered ceasefire, but its strategic implications reverberated through India’s defence establishment for years to come. The war had delivered several uncomfortable truths: that conflict between India and Pakistan was not an aberration but a persistent reality, that such conflicts could erupt with minimal warning, that command and control mechanisms between the Services were fundamentally inadequate, and that the IAF would be asked to deliver capabilities far beyond its modest colonial inheritance.

That realisation sparked a flurry of classified planning across India’s defence establishment. In 1949, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Ministry of Defence, and the Prime Minister’s Office all engaged in strategic scenario analysis to define India’s military posture in a world where both the Cold War and regional tensions were rapidly escalating.

The outcome of this analysis was a trinity of contingency plans in Paper No. 7 (49) dated 9 December 1949: Hercules, Matador, and Shikar. Each plan reflected different threat thresholds and political responses. Plan Hercules envisioned limited conflict triggered by communal violence in East Pakistan, with India retaliating if Hindu minorities faced systematic persecution. Plan Matador contemplated preemptive Indian intervention in East Pakistan to prevent humanitarian catastrophe or strategic crisis. However, the most significant of these plans, both in scope and long-term impact, was Plan Shikar.

Unlike its counterparts, Plan Shikar did not depend on extraordinary circumstances. It was predicated on the ordinary nightmare: that India would once again face unprovoked aggression, that escalation would be rapid and decisive, and that the IAF had to be prepared not merely in theory but in actual operational deployments. The plan called for a defensive posture that was inherently forward-leaning, demanding rapid mobilisation capabilities, seamless joint operations with Army and Naval elements, and the capacity for swift escalation if deterrence failed.

And Shikar brought with it a new reading of India’s threat map. While Punjab remained the most likely theatre of ground conflict, the plan acknowledged that air and sabotage threats could also emerge in Bombay and Calcutta—coastal cities vulnerable to naval strikes, espionage, and internal disruption. The IAF’s responsibilities, in this vision, were no longer limited to a regional scope.

The Shikar Framework

For the Indian Air Force, Plan Shikar represented both an unprecedented challenge and a defining institutional moment. For the first time in its brief history, the Service was required to translate high-level strategic intent into concrete operational formations, establishment charts, radar deployments, squadron roles, and airbase infrastructure.

At the core of Shikar was a phased mobilisation scheme, designed to be scalable and time-sensitive. In the “Pre-Warning” phase, Air Headquarters was expected to raise nucleus HQs for future formations, nominate officers and airmen for specific roles, identify standby airfields, and begin stockpiling fuel, spares, and rations. If tensions escalated to a “Warning Period,” the IAF would move into Phase I, which involves requisitioning civil aircraft, deploying radar units forward, and positioning key fighter and bomber squadrons. Phase II, termed “Initial Operations,” would encompass the launch of strategic strikes, attempts to achieve air superiority, and the provision of close support to Army thrusts. Finally, Phase III would mark the transition to sustained operations, encompassing close air support, battlefield logistics, and full-spectrum joint warfare.

Perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of Plan Shikar was its complete reconceptualisation of command and control arrangements. The plan proposed the establishment of four Air Task Forces, each physically co-located with Army and Naval commands in their respective operational theatres. The No. 1 Air Task Force would be headquartered in Ambala, partnering with the XI Corps to secure Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. No. 2 Air Task Force, based in Bombay, would align with Southern Command and naval leadership to monitor the Arabian Sea approaches and the Kathiawar coastline. No. 3 Air Task Force in Calcutta would anchor operations in Bengal and along the eastern frontier. A potential No. 4 Air Task Force was designated for Jammu but would only be activated if Plan Hercules was implemented. This innovation would eventually evolve into the Tactical Air Centres and Advanced Headquarters that continue to define Indian air power doctrine today.

Infrastructure Transformation

The realisation of Plan Shikar’s ambitious vision necessitated comprehensive infrastructure development. At the time of the plan’s formulation, the Indian Air Force operated only four wings: Jammu, Poona, Palam and Agra,. These would be renumbered as 301 to 304 Wings for the duration of mobilisation, marking their transition to wartime establishment. Simultaneously, six new wings would be raised: 305 Wing at Adampur, 306 Wing at Halwara, 307 Wing at the Air Force Academy in Ambala, 308 Wing at Willingdon (now Safdarjung Airport in Delhi), 309 Wing at Ahmedabad and 310 Wing would be established at Barrackpore to support eastern operations.

One particularly intriguing unit was 308 Wing, proposed at Willingdon. It had a particular wartime mandate: to requisition and coordinate civilian transport aircraft for military use. Although not activated immediately, it was included in Phase I of the plan.

Plan Shikar also addressed one of the most glaring deficiencies exposed during the Kashmir War: inadequate radar coverage. The 1947-48 conflict had revealed India’s vulnerability, with the Indian Air Force relying on a single radar unit at Palam, supplemented by two hastily established units at Poona and Deolali during Operation Polo, all equipped with obsolete ex-Royal Air Force equipment considered outdated even by 1945 standards. The plan mandated the establishment of three additional radar units at Ferozepur, Amritsar, and Bombay to address critical gaps in air defence coverage, particularly in the northwest approaches.

March 1950 – Shikar is activated

The theoretical framework of Plan Shikar underwent its first practical test in March 1950, when communal riots broke out in East Pakistan. The deteriorating situation prompted the Defence Committee of the Cabinet to approve pre-warning preparations. On 14 March 1950, Air Headquarters issued Operations Directive 1/50, ordering the activation of Air Task Force headquarters, radar units, and new wings.

The subsequent 48-hour period witnessed one of the most intensive mobilisation efforts in IAF history. By 16 March 1950, three Air Task Forces had been established: No. 1 at Ambala, No. 2 at Bombay, and No. 3 at Barrackpore. Concurrently, five new wings became operational: 305 and 306 Wings at Adampur and Halwara, respectively, 307 Wing at Ambala utilising the Air Force Academy infrastructure, 309 Wing at Ahmedabad and 310 Wing at Barrackpore. Three radar units were simultaneously formed: No. 4 at Ferozepur, No. 5 at Amritsar, and No. 6 at Bombay.

Within two days, the Indian Air Force had established the complete institutional framework for wartime operations, comprising three Air Task Forces, five wings, and three radar units. While this achievement was remarkable on paper, practical implementation proved considerably more complex. The Indian Air Force lacked both the personnel and material resources to staff these formations fully. Officers were reassigned from peacetime positions, signals personnel and radar controllers were in critically short supply, and maintenance crews were severely overstretched. Airfields had been identified, but their infrastructure remained inadequate.

Despite these challenges, the achievement remained historically significant. For the first time since Independence, the Indian Air Force had successfully translated strategic planning into operational reality, creating actual formations that existed not merely on organisational charts but as functioning entities on the ground.

Winds of Change: June 1950 to June 1951

By late May 1950, the immediate crisis that had triggered the activation of Plan Shikar began to subside. Communal tensions in East Pakistan decreased marginally, leading the Indian government to conclude that the pre-warning stage no longer justified full-scale mobilisation. For the Indian Air Force, which had created extensive new establishments without deploying combat aircraft, this marked a significant transition point. The crisis had passed, necessitating the dismantling of structures that had been hastily constructed just weeks earlier.

By late June, all three Air Task Forces were deactivated, their headquarters dissolved before they had directed a single operational sortie. 305 Wing at Adampur was reduced to a Care and Maintenance Party under the operational control of 306 Wing at Halwara. Subsequently, both formations were absorbed under the care of the Academy at Ambala, which became the parent headquarters for the number-plated northern Shikar assets. Two newly established radar units, No. 4 at Ferozepur and No. 6 at Bombay, were quietly disbanded.

But not everything raised under Shikar was put back in the box. Two wings survived the demobilisation: 309 Wing and 310 Wing. The former was repurposed and relocated from Ahmedabad to Jamnagar in November 1950, where it was converted into the Indian Air Force’s Armament Training Wing. 310 Wing at Barrackpore, designated for eventual development into a transport hub, was retained and formally redesignated as No. 6 Wing in September 1951, transitioning from a wartime placeholder to a permanent operational formation.

That raised an intriguing nomenclature puzzle: why was Barrackpore redesignated as 6 Wing when, at the time, the IAF had only four permanent wings? The answer lay in forward planning. Around the same period, Air Headquarters was evaluating Kalaikunda/ Gwalior as the site for a future fighter wing and had internally earmarked it as No. 5 Wing. With No. 5 already reserved on paper, the Barrackpore Wing took the next available slot, becoming 6 Wing, well before the fifth wing had been raised.

This demobilisation period may have provided some relief to Air Headquarters, which had demonstrated its capacity to activate Air Task Forces, establish wings, and deploy radar units rapidly, but faced severe constraints in combat squadron availability. This limitation had always been the most significant challenge facing Plan Shikar’s implementation.

When Plan Shikar was initially conceptualised in 1949, the Indian Air Force possessed only operational fighter squadrons equipped with essentially obsolete aircraft. The Tempest and Spitfire, both World War II veterans, constituted the force’s backbone. The only modern aircraft in induction was the de Havilland Vampire, India’s first jet fighter. The first Vampire squadron was established in 1949, with additional units planned over the following five to six years, although these remained in the early stages.

Plan Shikar’s order of battle demanded fifteen squadrons, nearly three times the Indian Air Force’s existing strength. The proposed solution was both desperate and necessary: to withdraw aircraft and pilots from training establishments at Ambala, Jodhpur and Secunderabad, as well as from the Base Repair Depot and the Aircraft Testing Unit at Kanpur. These resources would be rapidly assembled into operational units using second-line aircraft, including Harvards, Tempests, and Spitfires. While hardly ideal for modern combat operations, planners considered this approach preferable to complete unpreparedness.

It would have been a bare-bones war, fought with trainers and ageing piston-engined fighters, but it was the only path available. And perhaps that’s what makes Plan Shikar so remarkable—not for what it built, but for how honestly it accounted for the IAF’s limitations and still found ways to plan around them.

Shikar Strikes Back: The 1951 Reactivation

If the summer of 1950 had brought relief to the Indian Air Force, the summer of 1951 completely reversed this situation. By mid-year, the geopolitical environment had shifted dramatically. Kashmir tensions intensified, and Indian and Pakistani forces adopted mutual mobilisation postures. Cross-border skirmishes, inflammatory rhetoric, and concerning intelligence indicators brought both nations to the brink of renewed conflict. Serious concerns existed in South Block, military circles, and public discourse that another war was imminent.

Against this backdrop, Plan Shikar returned to operational status. On 11 July 1951, the Indian Air Force received orders to enter the Warning Period mobilisation phase. Unlike the previous year’s activation, this implementation would involve the deployment of combat squadrons.

The Indian Air Force promptly reactivated 305, 306, and 307 Wings, along with Air Task Forces 1, 2, and 3. Radar coverage again became a priority, with the restoration of No. 4 Radar Unit at Jamnagar and No. 6 Radar Unit at Barrackpore. But unlike the previous year’s mobilisation, 1951 would go further.

Five additional radar units were established to address critical gaps in India’s air and maritime surveillance capabilities. No. 7 Radar Unit at Colaba and No. 8 Radar Unit at Juhu provided enhanced monitoring of Arabian Sea shipping lanes and early warning capabilities along the western coast. No. 9 Radar Unit at Kanpur, No. 10 Radar Unit at Ambala, and No. 11 Radar Unit at Dwarka followed, each with defined regional responsibilities, particularly supporting naval operations between Kutch and the Kathiawar peninsula. For the first time since Independence, India’s western coastline possessed radar coverage and coordinated air-maritime operations.

The most ambitious element of the July 1951 activation was undoubtedly the establishment of new combat squadrons, a requirement that had remained theoretical in the previous year’s mobilisation.

At Palam, No. 2 Squadron was reformed with Spitfire aircraft, marking the return of one of the Indian Air Force’s most distinguished units. At Ambala, Nos. 14 and 15 Squadrons were established, again equipped with Spitfires sourced from the Air Force Academy. No. 16 Squadron had perhaps the most unusual origin, initially formed at Poona as the “No. 2 Wing Flight” with a strike role using Tempest aircraft obtained from 1 Base Repair Depot. Within weeks, it was officially redesignated as No. 16 Squadron, intended to be staffed by pilots from the Armament Training Wing at Jamnagar. For a brief period, the squadron operated in administrative limbo, reporting directly to the Officer-in-Charge Flying at 2 Wing. No. 17 Squadron was raised at Adampur, equipped with Harvard aircraft and staffed by instructors and pilots from the Flying Instructors School.

Regarding bomber operations, the Indian Air Force’s two strike squadrons, No. 5 and No. 6, both based at Poona, were ordered to relocate immediately to Kanpur for operational readiness. This eastward movement served strategic purposes: Kanpur positioned the squadrons within superior striking range of northwestern targets while reducing their vulnerability to western front operations.

By the conclusion of the July-August mobilisation, the Indian Air Force had not only reactivated the three Air Task Forces, two wings, and two radar units from 1950 but had also established five new radar units and five new fighter squadrons within a matter of weeks. This represented the largest organisational activation the Indian Air Force had undertaken since Independence.

This posture remained in effect for nearly a year, with high alert status maintained across cantonments, airfields, and radar stations. Training units were systematically stripped of personnel for combat roles. While no war materialised, the shadow of conflict loomed throughout the remainder of 1951 and into early 1952. Eventually, as tensions subsided by summer 1952, both Army and Air Force stood down from their forward deployments.

Two aspects of Plan Shikar warrant particular attention due to their long-term implications. The first concerned the coordination of anti-aircraft artillery for air defence. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that wherever guns and fighters coexisted, the senior Air Force commander would control local air defence, ending the jurisdictional conflicts that had plagued Jammu operations in 1948. Only in areas where fighters were absent would Army commanders control anti-aircraft guns.

The second development was the establishment of rudimentary strategic and tactical targeting procedures. Wing Commander H.S. Moolgavkar, later Chief of Air Staff, argued that once hostilities commenced, each Service would overwhelm Air Headquarters with targeting and airlift requests. His memorandum of 19 July 1951 established a tri-Service board chaired by the Director of Policy and Plans (Air) to prioritise bomber and photographic reconnaissance sorties, incorporating civilian experts, such as railway specialists, as required. This committee foreshadowed today’s Defence Planning Staff tasking mechanisms.

Strategic targets included Drigh Road’s depot containing 60,000 tons of explosives, underground operations room, and equipment depot; Naushera/Chaklala’s sub-depot for explosives, second-line repair facilities, and equipment depot for No. 1 Group Peshawar; Chitoram’s small explosive depot, aircraft repair facilities, and operations room; Samasata’s rail communication centre; Sukker Barrage Dam; and Lahore’s rail and road communication centre. Tactical targets encompassed airfields and bridges.

Did Shikar end with the 1952 stand-down—or did it slip into the bloodstream of the IAF in ways no one quite saw coming? Part 2 promises another chapter of buried twists and strategic brinkmanship.

Part 2 continues here.

Author’s Note and Sources

This reconstruction is based entirely on primary archival material: classified directives, internal memos, and official correspondence generated by Air Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence between 1949 and 1954. Wherever available, these have been corroborated with Form 1500 (Operations Record Books) for each establishment during the review period and authors own prior knowledge.

The following files, housed at the Ministry of Defence History Division, served as the core source base:

1. File No. 601/14513/H – Experience of Air Force and Air Force Matters (Jan 1949 – Dec 1956)
2. File No. 601/14362/H – Air Operations for the Defence of India
3. File No. 601/14408/H – Plan Shikar: P.S.O. Committee Minutes
4. File No. 601/14425/H – Plan Shikar: Strategical & Tactical Targets
5. File No. 601/14424/H – Plan Shikar and Plan Hercules: Inter-Services Cooperation Correspondence
6. File No. 601/14403/H – Use of Civil Airfields by the IAF
7. File No. 601/14395/H – Plan Shikar: Directives (No. 1 BRD)
8. File No. 601/14428/H – Formation & Establishment of No. 2 Wing Flight
9. File No. 601/14514/H – Defence Plan: Cabinet Secretariat Papers
10. File No. 601/14503/H – Defence of India: COS Papers No. 7(49), incl. Plan Hercules-II
11. File No. 601/14393/H – Formation & Establishment of Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Air Task Forces
12. File No: 601/14423/H – Plan Shikar and Hercules Policy