#IAFHistory

Indian Air Force is responsible for the Air Defence (AD) of India. The ground AD system has played a pivotal role in shaping the outcomes of conflicts. Yet its historical evolution remains largely unknown & its heroes unsung. This thread attempts to change that.

The IAF’s initial role entailed support to the Army. On 09 Oct 44, 8 Sqn converted to Spitfires with AD being its primary role, thus becoming the first Fighter sqn. The CO, Sqn Ldr Coombes, nicknamed it “Pursoot” -the two Os symbolising two eyes looking out for bogies!.

But eyes that were needed were the radars! Prior to 1942, even the word “Radar” was treated as a secret & Indians were not allowed to get close. When the war in SEA started to gain importance, the first batch of Indian Radar officers were commissioned & sent to UK for trg. 

By ’45 as the war ended, then Govt (British in India) decided to do away with Radars. Radar was considered too advanced for the IAF & radar cover for India deemed unnecessary. All eqpt was thus left severely damaged, some rumored to have been sabotaged.

Most of the radar operators & mechanics were permitted to leave or change their trades/branches. Immediately after indep, the new Govt decided to recall all the released offrs & men to revitalize the nucleus of radar capability in the IAF. Infact IAF had a RAD branch for offrs

A mobile “type 22 Station” incl one “Type 11 search radar” (500 m/c band) & one “type 13 Radar” (10 cm band) was the first to be made operational. This unit was christened No 1 Radar Unit & moved to Palam (c 1948), becoming the first Signal Unit (SU) in the IAF.

Subsequently, members of this unit moved to Tambaram to retrieve & service another “Type 22 station” from RAF Disposal hangars. It moved to Poona to become No. 2 Radar Unit. This was subsequently moved North to a stn in Punjab to become IAF’s 1st GCA.

Sqn Ldr TJ Thomas, then was incharge of assessing these items & bringing them on charge & spent several years on this task, recollected – “These disposables were not in any hangar. They were out in the open by the side of the cross runway, packed in containers and vehicles”.

By 1949, more of these sets were made operational and No. 3,4 5,6 & 7 Radar Units were formed, serving predominantly as early warning radars. These were the last lot of eqpt that could be salvaged from disposals. The radars could not be used in the 1947-48 Kashmir war. 

In 1949, the IAF ordered five static Sector Operations Centres (SOC) Stations from Marconi of UK. The AD concept envisaged was on the British pattern of SOCs, Ground Control Interception (GCI) and Early Warning (EWs) units. 

First SOC,11 SU was established at Delhi in 1954. By 1962, the IAF had setup five SOCs, each equipped with Marconi T-13 (Ht finder),T-14 & T-15 surveillance radars, four mobile GCI units with T-15 & four EWs of the AN/TPS-1E mobile radars (from Italy) which were mast mounted.

SOCs were No. 11, 16, 18, 20 & 27 SUs located at Delhi, Ambala, Jodhpur, Barrackpore & Bombay respectively. There were no video map or cursor facilities. The T-15 radar had a max range of 150 nm. Important locations were marked on a talc sheet & superimposed on the console.

The ops complex at SOC had a semi-circular sunk-in floor area called General Situation Map (GSM). Staff included – S Ops Offr, Chief Controller, Fighter Marshal and Movement & Liaison Officer (MLO). Two interception cabins called Red & Blue had the radar consoles & VHF RT.

AVM KA Joseph was leading the tech effort. Joseph had studied at the Marconi College at Chelmsford. He got a post-graduate diploma in Wireless Transmitters & Receiver designing. By then WWII started. So he worked as an engineer with Marconi works for the first three years.

In Jan ‘42, he was selected as a King commissioned officer in the RAF. In May ‘44 at his request, he was transferred to the IAF. In December 1953 he became the first Indian to be the Director of Signals and would remain so till 1971, conceptualizing the radar/Signal backbone.

Radars too needed eyes! And the breed of Fighter Controllers was born. Key task – to use the info on the radar and vector the fighter pilot to the enemy aircraft till the pilot gave the “Tally Ho” call. IAF would see numerous legendary Fighter controllers in subsequent years.

A few officers from flying branch were trained as fighter controllers in UK in 1952. Later C&R (Control & Reporting) School was established at 18 SU, Jodhpur. Courses started from Jan 58. Induction of A&SD (Adm) branch controllers commenced from Nov 1958. 

The first ten to be trained as Fighter controllers included – GK John, Randhir Singh, NL Soundarajan, JR Bankapur, RL Sayee, KD Irani, KT Abraham, M Dhanraj, CV Gole & Sheorey. John, Randhir Singh and CV Gole would retire as Air Marshals.

KT Abraham from the first lot would take over as the first chief trg offr and also the first flt Cdr of the 6 Mk52 Vampires used by the school for trg. He would receive a VM for his role as CO of a Signal unit in 1971. His role in AD setup remains largely unrecognized.

Controlling was done by eye-ball method and china graph pencil was the only aid available. It was used for marking the position of fighter and target, progressive D/R when there was no pick up, for measuring the range and bearing to the target and for passing pigeons. 

The IAF’s philosophy seems to have been to protect its three biggest cities – Delhi, Bombay & Calcutta and have protection for the western boundary with Pak, via SOCs at Ambala & Jodhpur. PAF too had established a credible network of its own using Anglo-American support. 

The radars in 1962 consisted of one Type 8 radar, six T-13 radars, seven T-14 & 10 T-15 radars. The meager number of radars did not provide any defence in depth. Vital areas, with the exception of Delhi, were provided with a maximum of 80-170 km of early warning.

At the sites where only Type 15 was available, the close control capability was somewhat adversely affected due to unreliable height information. The Type 14 and 15 had large clutter areas which degraded the radar surveillance and control capability. 

IFF ((Identification Friend or Foe) Mk.III, a WWII system, was installed at each of the SOC and GCI and in most of the fighter aircraft. During the 1962 war, the IAF was not used offensively, but the war did highlight the obsolete IAF AD Network.

A purported threat to our cities, especially Calcutta spurred the Govt into action. This paranoia proved beneficial to the IAF. Immediately post the 1962 war, changes were made across three vectors – AD Command & Control structure, modern equipment from America & USSR and a Surface to Air missile defence system (SA-2).  

IAF setup “Air Defence Area” HQs at Ambala, Jodhpur & Barrackpore headed by Air Cmde’s, responsible for all AD in the Area. In 1966, these were renamed as Air Defence Control Centre (ADCC) & co-located with Cmd HQ. These days the org is led by an AVM designated as AD Cdr.

“Ex – Shiksha” was conducted in Nov 63. RAF sent Javelins, RAAF Canberras & USAF F-100s & two mobile radar units having MPS 11/ 16 radars. Javelins were deployed at Kalaikunda, Canberras at Agra, F-100s at Palam & the radar units (named 311 & 411 SUs) at Patiala and Rampurhat.

The performance of IAF pilots & controllers was appreciated. Best interceptions were done by “Charlie” Puranik from 411 SU. 6 x American Star Sapphire units (500 SU series) with FPS 89 & 100 radars & 12 x P-30 units (200 SU series) were approved for induction.

FPS 100 was a 2-D Surveillance Radar & FPS-89 a Ht Finding Radar. These were huge and radomed. (Pak had its fore-runner version- FPS 20 & FPS 6). Originally, the installation was overseen by the engineers of Bendix Radio Corporation. US Assistance was withdrawn in Sep 65.

Since only two SUs had been installed, No. 1 Electronic Engineering and Installation Unit (EE&IU) was raised for completing this task. The tech officers assigned to the task performed admirably. Much later the unit was renamed as 17 SU.

Locations of Star Sapphire units were planned to counter both Pak & China. As per the US concept, complete works services for technical; admin and domestic accommodation were carried out simultaneously at each location to make the units self-sufficient in all respects.

IAF switched over to the American terminology. SOC was renamed as Air Defence Direction Centre (ADDC), Controllers were now Directors, Chief Controller was Sector Director and so on.Trades of Rad/Opr and Ftr/Pltr were merged and renamed as ADSO.

Plotting & display of info was done on big Perspex Vertical Plotting Boards. Brightly lit Ops rooms, were now dimly lit. Independent tropo-scatter communication network was planned to reduce dependence on P&T lines. Rdr & Comm Project Office (RCPO) and Dte of Plan ADGES were created at AirHQ.

USSR agreed to provide SA-2 surface to missiles for 17 firing, 4 tech & one trg battalion. These were deployed – 5 in Chandigarh-Ambala, 6 at Calcutta, 6 at Delhi & one trg and support at Baroda. Eqpt arrived by Apr 64 and by Oct 65, USSR had delivered 144 SA-2 missiles.

SA-2 purchase from USSR was not taken well by the USA. In now declassified CIA files, they tracked the move of the SA-2 systems as they left USSR & were installed in India.

The SA-2 system had a V-750 missile and two-stage propellants. The control surfaces on the two fins were guided by radio command. The target was tracked by radar which fed a signal to a computer. It was designed to engage targets between the ranges of 7-40 km. 

Subsequent shipments after the 1965 conflict boosted the strength by an additional 8 sqns, to 48 launchers and 75 missiles, all of which were delivered between 1968-72. 34 Sqn became the first Trg sqn and 46 Sqn, commanded by ML Sethi (later Air Mshl) was the first combat sqn.

SA-2 were organised as clusters. 6 SAM “Wings” were formed with sites around the wing in a 50km radius. The philosophy had remained the same – in addition to eyes, have missile protection for key cities & installations. 24 and 31 wings were disbanded in 1992, the rest remain.

ML Sethi was a pioneer. He was amongst the first batch of Air Force personnel to be trained on a SAM system. As Officer Commanding of an operational SAM squadron , undeterred by hardships, he achieved the distinction of the first SAM unit in IAF to become operational.

Two decades of effort came good during the 65’ and 71’ wars. The AD Setup of IAF did a phenomenal job in altering the outcome of the war by forcing the enemy to alter tactics and helping the IAF strike element notch up kills. 

Despite the frenetic pace of acquisitions post the 62’ War, IAF had only operationalised a miniscule part when 65’ war broke out. Only 2xP-30s & 1xStar Sapphire were Ops. SA-2s were deployed but in small Nos with ltd op trg given to staff.

230 SU at Amritsar was one of the only two P-30s opl. It could look deep into Pak territory & found itself nicknamed “Fish Oil” & at the top of the PAFs tgt list. 29 msns were launched against it with F-86s, F-104s & RB-57s, but “Fish Oil” continued churning.

Commanded by Wg Cdr. Krishna Dandapani, 230 SU was covered by 45 AD Regt with 40mm L/60 AA Guns + a troop of 19 AD Regt 40mm L/70 AA Guns. The story of surviving PAF attacks is best read here.

The credit for the first Air-to-Air Kill of free India on 3 Sep 65 must be shared with 230 SU which directed the pilots through the melee. The SU was to play a role in most of the 15 odd A-to-A kills claimed by IAF in the western sector.

Flt Lt Kunwar Yogendra Singh was awarded a VSM for his role as the Fighter Controller on 3 Sep 65. He was also responsible for many more successful interceptions on the 5, 7, 8 & 9 Sep 65. Dandapani (CO) & Lakhmir Singh (STO) were also awarded AVSMs.

Dandapani had marshaled his resources superbly – also controlling ac himself & kept moving his Radar. Lakhmir Singh kept repairing the damage caused by relentless attacks in quick time. Ground AD of IAF had made truly announced its presence.

Gallant stories abound. S/L Prithpal Singh with EW Radar in Jammu alerted Amritsar with commendable efficiency, was awarded AVSM. LAC Gopinathan kept Radar opl during hostile fire & earned a VSM, as did AC Kulkarni who tracked enemy a/c & rushed to AD gun and fired at it.

Not to be left behind, the pilots of C&R School, who were assisting the training of Fighter Controllers at Jodhpur flew CAP msns and earned a VrC, VM and VSM for the role in 1965 war.

Like the SU’s, the SA-2 were barely opl by the time 65’ war started. There appears to have been at least two occasions on which the missiles were fired in anger. On 8 Sep 1965, one SA-2 was fired against an unidentified target believed to have been on a night msn above Delhi.

News reports claimed the destruction of a PAF C-130 west of Delhi – which turned out to not have any basis. Photo of the wreckage seemed to indicate that the wreck of the self-destructed missile was shown as the shot down aircraft.

On 10th Oct 65, PAF sent one of their two RB-57F “Droopy” Canberra Recce aircraft over Ambala, flown by Sqn Ldr Rashid Mir & Fg Offr Sultan of No 24 Squadron PAF. Somewhere near Amritsar, the ac was acquired by the radar & three missiles were launched at the target. 

The RB-57F was straddled by the explosion of two of the SA-2s, damaging it but made an emergency landing at Peshawar. It was estd that ac suffered over 170 holes in the fuselage due to the shrapnel of the warheads. The ac was returned to the US and never saw service again. 

The single biggest achievement of the AD setup by the 65 war – The era of high-altitude bombing raids was a thing of the past. Acknowledged by none other than the official PAF Historian, John Fricker in “Battle for Pakistan” (quoted below-

The P-30s (200 Series) and Star Sapphires (500 Series) were fully opl in the two years after the 65’ war in accelerated pace of activity. The SA-2 had tasted blood and were fully operationalised too. 1971 war would bring significantly more action for the AD boys.

The high point for the 71 war was when 253 SU guided the IAF pilots during the famous Boyra Battle. Flt Lt KB Bagchi, as the Interception Director, on 22 Nov 71, observed on his radar scope one single blot close to Jessore heading in and scrambled four Gnats from Dum Dum.

He positioned them with precision & continued to give direction to pilots and this resulted in the shooting down of three PAF Sabre Jets and capture of two pilots. One of the world’s most epic air-two-air combats ever. Bagchi was awarded a VM.

Two effective innovations were remarkable – Young F/O Sankaranarayanan rigged the RT to listen in to PAF pilot chatter & relayed it to FCs of 230 SU. This proved a big help in safe recovery of strike missions, initiate tactical action and claiming `kills’ He was awarded VSM.

MOFs (Mobile Observation Flights) were still in the making. To augment info on low flying ac, it was decided to integrate the network of railway stns along the border. Railway Divisional Hqs at Amritsar had a string of stations along the border communicating directly to it. 

Teams visited stations to train the railway staff about the procedures & sequence of reporting. Compass circles were drawn at each location for ease & accurate direction reporting. The network proved very useful especially in case of night raids towards Pathankot & Amritsar.

230 SU would again face the same music as 65’ war, being attacked relentlessly and being in the thick of action. They returned the same coin – would remain ops, claim kills and earn awards. Gabbu Sen (CO) got a VM and RC Mahadik, FC on dep from TACDE got a M-in-D.

230 SU can again claim credit for brining down PAF pilot Amjad Hussain again with AAA fire. It was his third attempt to put 230 SU out of action. This time slower and lower, he was hit. His capture story here.

On 5 Dec 71, 230 SU picked up a few plots on a track heading towards Pasrur & heard it being guided to some target. Realising that PAF fighter was being vectored to one of our strike msns they gave blank calls on all available RT channels for the mns to get down.

A little later they heard a Msn 206 asking if it was safe to climb now. After authentication, asked to climb & picked about 15 kms south east of bulge in our territory heading on the desired course. It was one of the 7 bombing missions flown by An-12s of 44 Sqn Flt Cdr.

501 SU, the Star Sapphire system and the big “ADDC” in Western Sector would rise to the occasion. Its CO, Gp Capt KT Abraham, from the first batch of FCs in IAF was awarded a VM, as was Sqn Ldr Shailesh Kumar, the FC for his intelligent planning and meticulous coordination.

Not Surprisingly and fully deservingly, the first Signal Units to receive President Colours were 501 SU (2016) and 230 SU (2018). The impact that these two units had on the 65’ and 71’ war was far greater than any single flying unit in the IAF.

By the time the 1971 war erupted, India had improved the SA-2’s low-altitude coverage by introducing the Fan Song E radar. It was now capable of guiding missiles at aircraft as low as about 1,000 feet. The missiles were also deployed at Agra, Halwara, Chandigarh and Adampur.

It would fire twice during the 71 war – both times at a B-57, and missing both times. First at Halwara on 5th Dec (64 Sqn) and second time at Agar on the same night (74 Sqn). Then W/C TK Sen, OC Flying, Halwara narrated the incident (Attached).

With the close of 71’ war hostilities, the AD setup of the country has proven itself worthy but had also found itself in need of further upgrades. I also must thank G/C ML Bountra, an ace Fighter Controller, for his inputs on the AD threads. Bountra sir was COO in 230 SU during the 71 hostilities, and in various SU prior. He received a M-in-D during the 71 war. He is considered a pioneer in the FC community. His experience and detailed writings have greatly contributed to our knowledge on AD setup and evolution. 

Originally published on twitter as a three part series – Part 1, Part 2, Part 3.