In December 1971, Karachi became more than just a strategic target; it became the symbol of a contest between the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force. Amidst the din of war, each sortie flown by the Air Force and every missile launched by the Navy at Karachi led to a clamour of claims. This narrative hopes to set the factually correct chronology of events that brought Karachi Harbour to its feet, revealing the complexities of warfare where history is often written in shades of grey.
Karachi Harbour
The evolution of Karachi as a port offers a captivating history. Captured in 1843, the Province of Sind, with Karachi at its heart, became a crucial part of British India. Initially governed by Sir Charles Napier as a distinct province, it merged into the Bombay Presidency in 1847. Located on the Arabian Sea’s northern fringe, 50 miles west of the Indus River’s central mouth and 495 miles from Bombay, the harbour was originally a creek allowing anchorage for light draught vessels. The first significant infrastructural efforts were the timber pile pier at Keamari, which served native crafts and lighters, and the Napier Mole causeway, a 2-mile link between Keamari islands and the mainland.
With establishing the Port Trust in 1886, Karachi’s port gained facilities for a seagoing steamer, a bulk oil pier, a heavy lift pier, and an import yard, enhancing its operational capacity. The transformation was profound by 1936, as Sind’s designation as a separate province with Karachi as its capital marked the port’s size and strategic value growth. By the time of Pakistan’s independence in 1947, Karachi emerged as the nation’s sole port, incorporating commercial and military vessels.
By 1971, Karachi served as Pakistan’s maritime trade nucleus and hosted the Pakistan Navy’s headquarters, with the bulk of its fleet stationed off Karachi Harbour. Additionally, it boasted an oil refinery at Korangi Creek and an oil storage reserve at Keamari, critical for the nation’s energy security.
Karachi Defences
Between 1966 and 1971, the Pakistan Air Force embarked on a mission to upgrade and modernise its communication and radar systems. Despite these efforts, budget constraints severely limited the acquisition of essential low-level radar, crucial for monitoring approaches to strategic areas. With sparse radar coverage and a limited number of aircraft, the PAF found itself stretched too thin to shield every vital point from potential Indian assaults. Consequently, significant swathes of Pakistani territory, including the critical Karachi Port and its petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage facilities, lay exposed to maritime attacks.
As conflict broke out, the PAF’s options for maritime offensive support were confined to nighttime bombing runs on select Indian Navy coastal installations along the Saurashtra coast and daytime strafing and rocket attacks on nearby surface vessels. Detection efforts leaned heavily on passive tactics, tapping into the Pakistani Navy’s signals intelligence network, both shore-based and at sea. However, the onset of hostilities led to a sharp decline in communications and radar transmissions, drastically diminishing the efficacy of signals intelligence.
For active surveillance, attention turned to a potent radar at Manora, capable of spotting contacts up to 100 nautical miles away under ideal conditions. However, naval vessels engaged in flotilla surveillance faced the peril of revealing their locations when activating their radars. The most effective surveillance method, airborne reconnaissance, highlighted a significant gap due to the Pakistani Navy’s lack of dedicated air assets. Reliance fell on the PAF’s scant six C-130s, earmarked for unconventional bombing and unavailable for reconnaissance duties.
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) stepped in. A Fokker F-27, manned by a volunteer civilian crew and equipped only with weather radar, was repurposed for the Navy before hostilities commenced. Offering basic search functionality over calm seas, this arrangement barely scratched the surface of operational needs.
The Pakistani Air Force operated a radar station at Badin, bolstered by F-104 jets stationed at nearby bases. Armed with AN/ASG-14T radar, these jets could spot targets 20 nautical miles away in look-up mode. Indian Air Force planes, like the Canberra or Hunters flying from Poona or Jamnagar, would typically need to skirt around Badin to hit inland targets. For Karachi port strikes, they could take a longer sea route to dodge Badin’s radar despite the extra fuel this required.
Indian Plans
The Wellington Staff College regularly simulated attacks on Karachi Harbour, a strategy with a three-pronged aim. First, block the port, preventing access for military and civilian vessels, thus choking off supplies. Second, to strike the oil infrastructure close to the port was vital as it supplied nearly 75% of the country’s needs. Lastly, to limit the use of nearby airfields, Drigh Road and Masroor Airbase at Mauripur, crippling air support capabilities.
The challenge was Karachi’s location: it sat at Pakistan’s western edge, a daunting 400 kilometres across Pakistani territory from the Indian Air Force’s westernmost base in Jamnagar. For the Navy, this meant penetrating a fortress. These exercises underscored the high risk of attacking Karachi without a simultaneous diversionary assault by the IAF on Pakistani airfields near the harbour. Yet, with coordinated air support, the mission showed promise.
Unexpectedly, a joint strike on Karachi Harbour by the Indian Air Force and Navy did not materialise, with the reasons for this decision somewhat ambiguous despite frequent coordination for rescue operations and air cover. Naval historians recount that the Navy Chief pushed for an IAF strike on Karachi. Still, Air HQ dismissed the idea, citing the operational range of the Hunters as insufficient and the necessity of neutralising Badin first. However, this rationale appears flawed, given that Canberra aircraft from 35 Squadron had already targeted the Mauripur airbase near Karachi on the war’s first night. Air Chief Marshal Lal pointed to the risk posed to foreign ships in the port as a significant concern.
Despite these early reservations, Karachi Harbour eventually endured two separate strikes from the Indian Air Force and Navy during the 1971 War. The erupting fires at the Keamari oil facilities symbolised the impact of these attacks.
4th December 1971 – IAF draws first blood
On the evening of December 3rd, the skies over seven Indian Air Force airfields erupted as the Pakistan Air Force unleashed a series of attacks. In response, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared that the skirmishes over Bangladesh had escalated to a full-scale war with India. Amid this declaration, darkness enveloped the Jamnagar airbase, and its families hastily evacuated to the city’s safer locales. Within this charged atmosphere, Wing Commander Don Conquest, leading the Operational Training Unit (OTU), noted his squadron had no missions assigned for the next day. Seizing the initiative, Conquest approached Air Commodore Pete Wilson with a bold proposition: a squadron strike on Karachi using the OTU’s Hunters. Wilson, amidst preparations for a strike on Badin and Drigh Road, endorsed Conquest’s plan, which Air Headquarters swiftly approved.
The Hunter 56A, a recent variant in the Indian Air Force arsenal, boasted a critical enhancement: an increased external fuel capacity with 2 x 100 plus 2 x 230-gallon drop tanks. This upgrade was crucial for the extended journey to Karachi and back, a detail central to Conquest’s strategy.
Early on December 4th, four Hunters soared towards Karachi, tasked with a daring low-altitude raid aimed at the oil storage tanks in the harbour. The strike force, led by Conquest and including Squadron Leader SN Medhekar, Flight Lieutenant PK Mukherjee, and Flight Lieutenant SK Gupta, flew without rockets, relying on their 30 mm cannons for the assault. A preliminary gun test over the sea revealed Mukherjee’s weapon malfunction, prompting a three-aircraft formation to proceed.
As they neared Karachi, the rising sun illuminated the silver oil tanks against the horizon. The pilots launched two attack runs, triggering towering explosions and dense smoke clouds that severely limited visibility and necessitated an early retreat under fire from anti-aircraft guns on nearby ships. Due to the low-altitude seaward direction surprise of the Hunters, neither Pakistan Air Force fighters nor the Navy’s anti-aircraft artillery could respond in time.
The attack’s spectacle, with flames leaping high into the sky, was etched into the memories of Pakistani officers at the Naval Academy Karachi, who witnessed the assault disrupt their morning parade. Rear Admiral Khalid Wasay, then a lieutenant, vividly remembers the aircraft’s sudden appearance and the explosions that ensued, the smoke from the burning oil tanks casting a shadow over their Passing-out Parade.
While the psychological impact of the firestorm was profound, India and Pakistan offered conflicting assessments of the damage. Pakistan downplayed the effect, claiming only five storage tanks were lost, totalling around 15,000 tons of oil. India, however, assessed the damage to be more extensive, with ten tanks aflame.
Strike Two – Indian Navy strikes the Harbour
On December 2, 1971, unaware of the imminent conflict, the Indian Navy’s Western Fleet embarked on a strategic manoeuvre near Karachi, Pakistan’s principal port, integrating newly commissioned missile boats for the operation. Amid rising tensions, their mission was to engage Pakistan’s naval and harbour defences, with a primary focus on enemy ships at sea and a secondary aim to strike land targets when possible.
By December 4, this fleet had transformed into the Karachi Strike Group, Operation Trident. Three Vidyut-class missile boats led the charge—INS Nipat, INS Nirghat, and INS Veer—each equipped with four SS-N-2B Styx missiles. Two Arnala-class anti-submarine corvettes complemented their firepower, INS Kiltan and INS Katchall, and the fleet tanker INS Poshak broadened the group’s reach and flexibility.
At 22:30 hours, the Strike Group initiated its assault, a defining strike in naval history. INS Nirghat locked onto PNS Khaibar, sinking it with precision. INS Nipat then launched two Styx missiles, one decimating the munitions carrier MV Venus Challenger and the other severely damaging its protector, PNS Shah Jahan. INS Veer set its sights on PNS Muhafiz, landing a missile that swiftly sent the minesweeper to the ocean floor, leaving no time for distress signals.
Confronted with missile strikes for which it was unprepared, the Pakistan Navy urgently called upon the Pakistan Air Force for aerial support. Assigned to carry out 35 missions with an array of aircraft, including B-57s, F-104s, F-86s, and T-33s, the PAF struggled to locate and engage naval targets under the cover of night, rendering their efforts largely ineffective. Meanwhile, the Indian Navy executed its strategy, achieving a decisive victory without a single Indian casualty—a feat celebrated annually on December 4th as Navy Day.
On December 5th, the code “Angar” reached Vice Admiral S.N. Kohli, heralding the “killer boats” victory in Operation Trident. Kohli’s announcement that the Navy had sunk three ships coincided with BBC radio’s reports of flames engulfing Karachi’s oil storage tanks, contributing to the ambiguity over who initiated the Karachi strike.
The narrative around missile strikes on Karachi’s shore-based oil facilities remains contested. Reports from the Ministry of Defence History Division and Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani indicate that INS Nirpat fired only one missile, while INS Nirghat’s missile did not launch. The lone missile aimed at the harbour missed its mark. However, alternative accounts claim INS Nirpat fired two missiles toward the harbour’s entrance. Allegedly, one missile veered off into the sea, and the other purportedly hit a Keamari oil tank, though conclusive proof is absent.
The task force retreated into the night, marking a significant chapter in naval warfare history. During their withdrawal, the ships encountered several technical difficulties that impeded their progress and exposed them to potential enemy attacks. To safeguard the retreating ships, two Hunters from the OTU at Jamnagar and three MiG-21s provided air cover from 0300 to 0530 hours on December 5th, ensuring their safe passage in a critical moment of vulnerability.
Enabling these attacks – Canberra’s from 35 Squadron
Unbeknownst to Don Conquest and the Indian Naval Strike Group, Canberra aircraft from 35 Squadron, stationed at Poona, played a crucial role in the successful strikes on the harbour. They targeted the strategic Mauripur airbase (Masroor Airbase), essential for the port’s defence. Starting on the night of December 3/4th at approximately 0500 hours, four Canberras initiated the assault on Masroor, followed by an eight-plane raid the subsequent night around 2030 hours, significantly damaging runways and taxiways. The offensive continued on the night of December 5/6th, around 2230 hours, with three Canberras taking out an RB-57 Canberra and damaging a T-33 on the ground. The assault escalated on the night of December 6/7th, with eight Canberras hitting Drigh Road airbase, a key site for spares and supplies, with a repeat strike the following night on both Drigh Road and Masroor. Over five nights, 31 Canberra sorties delivered more than 50,000 lbs of bombs over Masroor and Drigh Road, escalating to 42 sorties by the war’s end.
The mission’s flight path was meticulously planned, from Poona to Jamnagar for refuelling, then over Bhuj towards Hyderabad, carefully avoiding Badin by about 50 miles, heading westward to the Iran border before descending towards Karachi for the strike. Post-mission, the route took them southwards over the sea back to Poona, minimising exposure to enemy radar and air defences. With a round trip extending 1,200 miles from Poona, these missions marked some of the longest ever undertaken by Canberra.
Commanding Officer KK Badhwar and Flight Commander AK Bhadra alternated, leading these critical attacks. Group Captain Bhadra disclosed,
“With no self-defence weapons on the Canberra aircraft, we mainly flew night missions at very low altitudes to evade enemy radar. Deploying about four aircraft per mission, we spaced each aircraft 3 to 6 minutes apart to prevent detection. Our arsenal comprised 1000 lbs and 4000 lbs bombs with delay fuses.”
On one mission on December 5th, Flight Lieutenants Nanda and Sandal targeted Masroor airbase. Their bombing run destroyed a pen near the runway, housing an enemy aircraft. However, as they exited, something seemed to have gone wrong, leading to a fatal crash and the loss of both crew members.
The 35 Squadron’s bravery was recognised with 5 Vir Chakras, an AVSM, 6 VSMs, a Vayu Sena Medal, and 3 Mentioned-in-Dispatches, following 92 operational sorties, primarily focusing on Karachi.
Third Strike – Navy attacks again on the night of 8/9th December
In response to the missile strike on the night of December 4th, a makeshift Fleet Air Arm sprang into action, crewed by civilian volunteers from PIA and the Flying Club. This team, flying by day within a 200-mile radius of Karachi, covered ground from Jamnagar to the Makran Coast. At night, radar-equipped aircraft continued the watch, ensuring round-the-clock surveillance. By the afternoon of December 5th, any missile boat nearing Karachi within 200 miles was promptly spotted. The Indian Navy, eyeing another strike on Karachi harbour, bided its time.
Then, on the night of December 8/9th, around 22:45hrs, lookouts at Manora spotted a menacing streak of light racing towards them. This spectral blaze soared past, crashing into Keamari’s oil tank farms. The explosion ignited a massive firestorm, lighting up the harbour with a glow visible for miles, reigniting fires that had just been doused from the December 4th air raid. “The Story of Pakistan Navy” states –
“The first missile flew over the ships at the anchorage, crossed Manora Island, and crashed into an oil tank at the Keamari oil farm. There was a huge explosion, and flames shot up so high that Qamar House, a multi-story building in the city, was visible.”
Seconds later, a second missile struck the British merchant vessel Harmatton, sending it to the sea’s floor. A third missile hit the SS Gulf Star under a Panamanian flag, which, despite significant damage, stayed afloat. A fourth missile hit its mark on the PNS Dacca, a Pakistan Navy supply ship, ending its 25-day sea stint. All four missiles were launched by the missile boat INS Vinash.
After this daring strike, the attackers quickly withdrew, leaving the Pakistani Navy’s surface fleet in disarray, unable to mount any further operations during the war.
Fourth Strike – Indian Air Force attacks the same night
The story of the December 1971 raid on Karachi Harbor isn’t complete without highlighting the Canberra bombers from 35 Squadron. Chronicled by Air Chief Marshals PC Lal, Dilbagh Singh, and Air Commodore KK Badhwar, the squadron commanding officer, these accounts claim successful strikes on Karachi’s oil storage but reveal confusion over how the target was chosen.
Air Chief Marshal PC Lal initially thought the attack was a joint decision between the Central Air Command and the Indian Navy. Yet, he later learned from KK Badhwar that the decision to hit the oil tanks was Badhwar’s own. Dilbagh Singh, on the other hand, suggested the oil tanks were a secondary target, with Badhwar green-lighted to attack them only if the primary target was unreachable.
The 35 Squadron was tasked with an eight-aircraft mission to Drigh Road on December 8/9th night at about 0300 hours. During this raid, the commanding officer, Wing Commander KK Badhwar, decided to alter his target. A note written by his lead Navigator, Wing Commander YP Singh, claims –
“We turned towards the new target. Flying at 8,000 ft at minimum speed due to the bombing run and aircraft buffeting because of the open bomb doors, we must have been painted on every radar within 250 km of our position. Not to mention the Pak night interceptors based at Karachi and the fireworks of the heavy ack-ack guns! We were over the oil tanks. I pressed the bomb release switch and watched as the bombs hit the tanks. The devastation below on impact was spectacular. Our bombs had turned those fuel storage tanks into a huge, nay, an enormously huge ball of fire. We did an orbit over the target. We could see that as the tanks exploded and caught fire, the fiery debris flew in all directions and hit other tanks nearby, creating a chain reaction. The fireball on the ground was seen by the rest of the bombers, which were now over Drigh Road runway.”
Badhwar maintained that he had hit the oil installations before the Navy had. This seems unlikely as his attack at 0300 hours was a good four hours after the Naval attack had occurred around 2230 hours earlier in the night.
KK Badhwar led the 35 Squadron with precision throughout the war, executing numerous critical strikes. While his counterparts received the Mahavir Chakra, Badhwar was awarded the Vir Chakra and the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal for his service. This distinction might stem from the debate around the target choice for the Karachi mission, a topic Dilbagh Singh touches upon in his memoirs.
Demystifying the claims
The debate over who delivered the decisive blow in the Karachi attacks has long stirred spirited discussions among India’s armed forces. For years, a tug-of-war over this accolade saw the Navy disputing the Air Force’s claim of striking first.
Documentation confirms that the Indian Air Force’s 35 Squadron Canberra bombers were the pioneers of the strike on Karachi, targeting the Mauripur airbase at 0500 hours on December 4, 1971. This was closely followed by a daring raid by OTU Hunters, under the leadership of Don Conquest, against the Keamari Oil Storage tanks at approximately 0900 hours the same day. The target was oil storage tanks, not a refinery, correcting some media inaccuracies.
The narrative of the conflict deepened with the Indian Navy’s intervention between 2300 hours and 0030 hours on the night of December 4/5th. The Navy’s missile boats executed a precise attack, sinking three Pakistan Navy Ships near Karachi Harbour. An additional missile fired towards the shore at 0002 hours missed its intended targets, casting doubt on claims that the Navy had struck the oil storage tanks during this phase of the operation. When Air Chief P.C. Lal learned of the Hunter attack, he graciously suggested, “Let the Navy take the credit. War is on.”
The immediate redeployment of Don Conquest to Jaisalmer following his raid resulted in a significant delay in reporting the extent of the damage inflicted, temporarily leaving Air Headquarters out of the loop regarding the operation’s success. This communication gap, combined with BBC’s reports of a fire at the Keamari oil tanks and Vice Admiral Kohli’s subsequent victory announcement, led to an accidental association of the Navy with the attack on the oil storage facilities.
However, shortly after extinguishing earlier fires, these facilities were targeted in the Navy’s subsequent strike on night of December 8/9. That night, Wing Commander KK Badhwar, piloting a Canberra, also claimed to have hit the oil tanks, though this claim lacks independent verification beyond his navigator’s testimony.
Declassified CIA documents now reveal that the strikes significantly disrupted Pakistan’s oil supply and reserves by effectively enforcing a blockade, presenting no immediate alternatives to counteract this threat. While the direct destruction of storage tanks was not devastating, the strategic impact of these operations was profound.
The Hamoodur Rahman Commission, established by Pakistan to investigate the war’s dynamics, underscored Karachi Port’s urgent need for low-level, seaward-looking radar. This gap had significantly compromised the port’s defence capabilities, especially in light of India’s missile boat blockade strategy. The commission criticised insufficient reliance on a mere fighter squadron and a limited bomber squadron for Karachi’s defence.
From my perspective, while all strikes on Karachi epitomised high courage, the daylight strike by the Hunters stood out for its sheer audacity and risk, ultimately achieving remarkable results. In this saga of bravery and strategic mastery, Don Conquest unequivocally is the battle’s most distinguished figure.
The Don whose Conquest went un-mentioned
Donald Melvyn Conquest, born on May 31, 1933, in Bangalore to Mervyn Patrick Conquest, embarked on a distinguished military career that would leave an indelible mark. His journey commenced with the 62nd Pilot Course in 1954 in the fighter stream.
Conquest’s service during the 1965 War with the 27 Squadron earned him a Mention-in-Despatches. This early accolade was merely the beginning of a career characterised by leadership and tactical acumen. He later assumed the role of Flight Commander for the 37 Squadron, followed by a staff tenure at the Pilot Attack Instructor School in Jamnagar.
Promoted to Wing Commander, Conquest was entrusted with the Operational Training Unit (OTU) command at Jamnagar, tasked with training young pilots in operating the Hunter aircraft. Under his leadership, the OTU became the No. 122 Ad hoc Squadron, ready to engage in combat operations during wartime.
Conquest’s strategic ingenuity was particularly evident in the audacious attack on Karachi’s Oil Storage tanks, a mission that significantly impacted the course of the conflict. Following this operation, he was redeployed to Jaisalmer, where he led forces during the Battle of Longewala. His command in this engagement resulted in unprecedented tank losses for the enemy.
On December 5, 1971, Conquest orchestrated a formidable strike on Mauripur airfield, inflicting widespread damage. His operational excellence continued with attacks on Drigh Road airfield and the Badin Radar site. Moreover, his leadership in close air support and interdiction missions was pivotal in neutralising a significant enemy armoured advance in the Longewala sector, demonstrating his strategic vision and courage under fire. Despite sustaining injuries from enemy fire in one of his missions, Conquest’s resilience and determination saw him leading his formation back to base.
Conquest’s extensive contributions during the 1971 War were recognised with the Vir Chakra, a commendation that, while prestigious, may not fully encapsulate the breadth of his heroism and the complexity of his achievements. The intricacies surrounding the recognition of his actions, especially considering the claims made by the Navy in Karachi and the Army in Longewala, add a layer of nuance to his legacy.
Donald Melvyn Conquest passed away in Australia on September 23, 2022, leaving a legacy of courage, leadership, and unwavering commitment to his country. His life’s work inspires future generations, serving as a testament to the profound impact one individual can have on the course of history.
Bibliography – This analysis draws upon diverse first-hand narratives, scholarly accounts and print publications. Principal sources include “Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy” by Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani, a publication endorsed by the Naval Headquarters. For insights into the Pakistan Air Force perspective, “Against All Odds” by Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail (Retd) was instrumental. Additionally, the research conducted by IAF historians Jagan Pillarisetti and Air Marshal Vikram Singh (Retd) on the 1971 War provided valuable context and detail, enriching the overall understanding of the events discussed.
So, whose Conquest was Karachi? I will leave it to the reader to decide.
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