Plan Shikar Part 2: From Blueprint to Backbone of the Indian Air Force

The thunderous activation of Plan Shikar in 1951—India’s largest peacetime military mobilisation since Independence—was followed not by war, but by a long and uneasy silence. But the genie could not be put back in the bottle. The Indian Air Force had crossed a threshold. What had begun as a contingency mobilisation had seeded expectations, structures, and strategic compulsions that refused to fade.

Part 2 of this narrative picks up at that delicate juncture—when the blueprints had been drawn, the units tasted activation. Yet, the political class hesitated to acknowledge the scale of what had been unleashed.

Missed Part 1? Read it here .

The Reckoning: Post-Shikar Reality Check

When Plan Shikar was formally deactivated in 1952, the Indian Air Force’s officially sanctioned strength stood at eleven flying squadrons—a figure that included the recently approved No. 11 Squadron, the IAF’s second transport unit, intended to service the eastern sector.

But reality outpaced paper. At the time of deactivation, the IAF was operating 14.5 squadrons:

• Spitfire – 3 squadrons (2 Sqn, 14 Sqn, 15 Sqn)
• Tempest – 5 squadrons (3 Sqn, 4 Sqn, 8 Sqn, 10 Sqn, 16 Sqn)
• Harvard – 1.5 squadrons (17 Sqn, 101 Sqn)
• Vampire – 1 squadron (7 Sqn)
• Liberator – 2 squadrons (5 Sqn, 6 Sqn)
• Dakota – 2 squadrons (11 Sqn, 12 Sqn)

The assumption in both North and South Blocks was straightforward: the Indian Air Force would quietly return to its pre-expansion configuration. This modest eleven-squadron force had previously served as the official benchmark. They were about to discover how fundamentally the strategic landscape had shifted.

When Theory Collides with Reality

The threat perceptions that had spawned Plan Shikar remained stubbornly alive. The Government of India continued to refine and expand contingency plans, evolving from Shikar III to the far more ambitious Hercules II. This strategy envisioned deep strategic bombing campaigns into Pakistani territory.

Such operations demanded even higher levels of combat readiness than the original Shikar concept. Yet by late 1952 and early 1953, the IAF’s actual condition presented a sobering contradiction to these grand strategic ambitions.

Although it had eleven fighter-bomber squadrons on paper, in truth, the manning, equipment, and readiness levels were so degraded that only half of them could be considered even nominally operational. And even that half was struggling. There was, however, one ray of hope: two additional squadrons had recently been converted to the Vampire, India’s first jet fighter. But this modernisation effort was still in its infancy.

The Mirror of Truth: January 1953

The true extent of the IAF’s fragility was laid bare in a classified paper dated 30 January 1953, sent by Air Headquarters to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It carried an urgent warning: while the fighter-bomber force was supposed to be the backbone of Plan Hercules II, that backbone barely existed.

The three Tempest squadrons had all been grounded completely. Their engines had developed chronic technical issues, and there was no clarity on when, or even if, they would return to service. Best-case estimates suggested that it would take two to three months just to reactivate one squadron. Bringing the others up to combat readiness would take significantly longer. Meanwhile, morale in these units had plummeted.

The Spitfire squadrons weren’t faring much better. According to Air Headquarters, their operational efficiency was down to just 25%, crippled by a shortage of propellers and other critical spares.

That left the Vampire squadrons—the IAF’s great hope. But even here, reality bit hard. While four Vampire squadrons were in operational training, they had been issued only twelve aircraft each, instead of the standard sixteen. One squadron had just completed conversion to the type and was not yet combat-effective. Another was mid-way through conversion and months away from being usable. Even among the operational units, the situation was grim: two Vampires in No. 7 Squadron at Palam had already been grounded due to a shortage of Goblin engines. India was entirely dependent on the UK for these engines, and the rearmament programme in the West had meant that no new engines were available.

Aircraft reserves were scarcely better. For a frontline strength of 48 Vampires, the IAF should have held 96 aircraft in reserve. It had only 16. The total fleet stood at 64 aircraft—48 assigned to squadrons, and just 16 on standby. Even with the anticipated delivery of 41 new Vampires from HAL by the end of 1953, total strength would only reach 105, with a reserve pool of 57—if no other squadrons were equipped with the type.

Adding to the concern was the Vampire’s limited combat capability. It could carry only four rockets per sortie, severely restricting its use in a heavy strike role. While efforts were underway to increase this payload to six rockets, this upgrade would take time.

A Brutal Assessment

In a moment of stark institutional honesty, Air Headquarters provided the Chiefs of Staff Committee with an unvarnished assessment of the IAF’s actual fighting strength in early 1953:

• Half a Spitfire squadron
• Two Vampire squadrons
• One Harvard squadron (reconnaissance role only)

Even this modest tally came with significant caveats. The Harvard, being fundamentally a training aircraft, was unsuited for frontline combat operations and would prove irrelevant during the critical opening phases of any high-intensity conflict.

In practical terms, the Indian Air Force possessed just 2.5 squadrons capable of meaningful offensive action—a stunningly inadequate force for implementing the strategic bombing campaigns envisioned under Plan Hercules II.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee received this assessment with evident alarm. The evaluation concluded with a chilling prediction: any attempt to implement Hercules II under current conditions would result in operational failure with potentially catastrophic consequences for national security.

To arrest the slide, the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommended the immediate procurement of a new generation of jet fighter-bombers. But they also reiterated a foundational point: the goals of Plan Hercules II were not achievable with an eleven-squadron force.

Air Headquarters emphasised that the Hercules II plan envisaged the use of 100 fighter-bombers and 12 Harvards. Meeting this demand would require nothing less than a 15-squadron IAF—fully staffed, fully equipped, and strategically funded.  The genie had been out of the bottle since 1951. By 1953, it was clear: it wasn’t going back in.

Defence Committee of Cabinet responds

The IAF’s crisis of capability had not gone unnoticed. At its 3rd meeting of 1953, held on 14 March, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet approved a bold first step: the purchase of 71 Dassault Ouragan aircraft to re-equip two IAF squadrons during 1953–54. The Ouragan, although not the most advanced fighter available, represented a significant leap over the service’s ageing piston-engined inventory.

By the Chiefs of Staff meeting of 27 January 1954, the procurement was already showing results. Of the 71 Ouragans ordered, 43 had arrived in India, with the remainder expected by April 1954. Air Headquarters expressed confidence that all aircraft would be erected and operational by June.

The first Ouragan squadron had already begun flying in the fighter role. Though it wasn’t yet equipped for the full fighter-bomber mission, its presence had started to relieve pressure on overstretched Spitfire and Tempest units. These early Ouragans could already deliver ground attack using their front guns, if not yet their full bomb and rocket payloads.

No. 8 Squadron converted to the Ouragan in August 1953, followed by No. 3 Squadron in February 1954. But there was one catch. The larger plan to expand the IAF to 15 squadrons, as initially envisioned under Plan Shikar and its successors, had been put into abeyance. The decision remained pending, caught in a policy tug-of-war.

Ministry of Defence Pushes the Case

For the Ministry of Defence, the hesitation around IAF expansion was untenable. They pointed out that the squadrons raised under Plan Shikar had always been under-equipped and under-strength, cobbled together in wartime haste. If India truly wished to field a credible force, these units would need to be formalised and adequately funded.

Matters had become more urgent by early 1953, when fresh intelligence revealed that Pakistan intended to expand its air force to 15 squadrons by 1956. The Ministry warned that the IAF had been stretched well beyond its sanctioned capacity, and the gap between paper plans and operational reality was growing dangerously wide.

Aircraft provisioning, ammunition, spares, transport—all were still being done based on an 11-squadron ceiling. Recruiting and training pipelines for pilots and ground crew had not scaled to match the expanded structure. Spares were running thin, and a breaking point was near. Aircraft could soon be grounded simply due to a lack of parts; squadrons could be left idle because of a shortage of trained personnel.

The Defence Ministry argued that, with careful budgeting and cutbacks from other defence heads, the IAF expansion could be managed. They acknowledged that building a properly equipped 15-squadron force would take time—at least four years—but it was a target worth setting. Their proposal aimed for completion by 31 March 1957.

Finance Ministry: The Voice of Caution

The Ministry of Finance, however, wasn’t convinced. They didn’t oppose expansion outright, but preferred a more phased approach. Rather than approve a full 15-squadron force upfront, they proposed expanding to 12 squadrons first, and then taking stock. Once that milestone was reached, the Government could re-evaluate aircraft availability, budget impact, and other relevant factors before approving further growth.

The Finance Ministry declined to support the Armed Forces Reorganisation Committee’s recommendation for 15 squadrons by 1957. They believed that such an expansion—if carried out in just three and a half years—would blow past the Planning Commission’s ceiling on defence expenditure.

In its proposal, the Defence Ministry had claimed that the 15-squadron plan would exceed the ₹35 crore ceiling only by a small margin. But Finance wasn’t buying it. That ₹35 crore cap, they pointed out, had been linked to a range of cost-cutting proposals, many of which had not materialised.

The biggest of these proposals had involved the Army. The Armed Forces Reorganisation Committee had recommended that the Army reduce its strength by 25,000 men in 1953–54 and by another 25,000 in 1954–55, resulting in significant budget savings. However, the actual reduction achieved was far more modest—approximately 10,000 per year. In other words, the savings that were supposed to fund the IAF’s growth simply hadn’t come through.

The Finance Ministry also made an interesting observation: Plan Shikar, in effect, had already given the IAF a 15-squadron structure, but on a shoestring. Back in May 1950, when the emergency mobilisation was triggered, the IAF’s fighter strength was already obsolete; the only way to increase the IAF’s firepower quickly was to form additional squadrons using the same outdated platforms.

By the end of 1954, the IAF was expected to have four or five Vampire squadrons and two Ouragan squadrons—modern jet aircraft with vastly superior capabilities. They were faster, more powerful, and better armed than the piston-engined fighters of the early 1950s. A 15-squadron force equipped with Vampires and Ouragans was, in every operational sense, far more potent than the 15-squadron force of 1950. The Finance Ministry’s implication was clear: the IAF didn’t necessarily need to grow to 15 squadrons again, because its current and future jets offered significantly more punch per squadron.

Breakthrough — and the American Shadow

The long bureaucratic impasse finally broke on 19 June 1953. At its third meeting that year, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet formally accepted the Armed Forces Reorganisation Committee’s recommendation to expand the Indian Air Force to a 15-squadron force. It had taken three years, countless inter-ministerial notes, and multiple rounds of argument, but the IAF’s institutional transformation was now officially sanctioned.

The approved force structure by March 1957 reflected this diversification:

• 8 Fighter-Bomber Squadrons
• 1 Night Fighter Squadron
• 1 Photo Reconnaissance Squadron
• 2 Light Bomber Squadrons
• 1 Maritime Reconnaissance Squadron
• 2 Transport Squadrons

By the time the ink dried on the approval, the IAF had already begun executing parts of the plan. In 1953, No. 2 Squadron transitioned to the Vampire. That same year, No. 15 Squadron was re-designated as No. 1 Squadron, and it too converted to the Vampire. No. 16 Squadron received Liberators in 1954, bolstering the IAF’s bomber capabilities. The legacy Harvard-equipped No. 17 Squadron entered the jet era with Vampires in 1955, followed by No. 14 Squadron in 1957.

Even as India was just catching its breath, a storm was brewing to the west. American military aid to Pakistan was materialising at speed—and with it, a dramatic boost to the combat strength of the Pakistan Air Force. Air Headquarters took serious note. Intelligence assessments painted a worrying picture.

By July 1958, the Pakistan Air Force was projected to field a formidable striking force: eight fighter-bomber squadrons, two medium bomber squadrons, and forty-eight night fighters modified to carry 2,000-pound bomb loads. This wasn’t a collection of obsolete hand-me-downs. Pakistan’s frontline strength would comprise F-86H Sabre Jets and F-84 Thunderstreaks—cutting-edge American aircraft that outclassed much of the IAF’s inventory.

The entire thrust of Pakistan’s air expansion was focused on its strike element, giving it the ability to project power decisively and rapidly. And critically, this growth came without the usual frictions of budgetary delay or procurement complexity, thanks to American aid flows.

A Counter-Move: Towards 25 Squadrons

Faced with this rapidly evolving threat, Air Headquarters pushed for a new expansion—this time to a 25-squadron force. The logic was sound: a larger, modernised Pakistan Air Force required a matching deterrent.

The familiar institutional dance resumed. The Defence Ministry championed the expansion; Finance preached fiscal restraint. But this time, the weight of strategic reality proved decisive. On 30 April 1956, a compromise emerged: approval for a twenty-one-squadron force structure. This would incorporate helicopters for the first time, introduce the formidable Canberra bomber, and bring in three new fighter types—the French Mystère, the British Hunter, and the Gnat.

A Legacy That Endures

The evolution of the Indian Air Force between 1950 and 1957 represents one of the most remarkable—and yet least understood—stories of post-independence institution building. What began as an improvised response to immediate threats under Plan Shikar evolved, through bureaucratic struggle and strategic necessity, into the architectural foundation of modern Indian air power.

The blueprints may have been classified and forgotten. The name “Shikar” may have vanished from public discourse. But its DNA persists in every aspect of contemporary IAF operations—in force structure decisions, operational doctrines, and the fundamental logic that guides Indian air power to this day.

Author’s Note and Sources

This reconstruction draws entirely from primary archival material housed at the Ministry of Defence History Division, including classified directives, internal correspondence, and operational records from the period 1949-1956. The narrative presents the most comprehensive account yet compiled of how emergency improvisation evolved into institutional transformation, laying the groundwork for the modern Indian Air Force.

The following files, housed at the Ministry of Defence History Division, served as the core source base:

1. File No. 601/14513/H – Experience of Air Force and Air Force Matters (Jan 1949 – Dec 1956)
2. File No. 601/14362/H – Air Operations for the Defence of India
3. File No. 601/14408/H – Plan Shikar: P.S.O. Committee Minutes
4. File No. 601/14425/H – Plan Shikar: Strategical & Tactical Targets
5. File No. 601/14424/H – Plan Shikar and Plan Hercules: Inter-Services Cooperation Correspondence
6. File No. 601/14403/H – Use of Civil Airfields by the IAF
7. File No. 601/14395/H – Plan Shikar: Directives (No. 1 BRD)
8. File No. 601/14428/H – Formation & Establishment of No. 2 Wing Flight
9. File No. 601/14514/H – Defence Plan: Cabinet Secretariat Papers
10. File No. 601/14503/H – Defence of India: COS Papers No. 7(49), incl. Plan Hercules-II
11. File No. 601/14393/H – Formation & Establishment of Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Air Task Forces
12. File No: 601/14423/H – Plan Shikar and Hercules Policy