Most people tell the story of the Indian Air Force in 1947 as one about Partition. Aircraft were split up, squadrons reassigned, and stations exchanged. As Independence neared, decisions were made quickly. Many assume the months before 15 August were spent only on dividing up the force.
But some details don’t add up. In April 1947, Wing Commander Arjan Singh became Station Commander at Risalpur. If the air force was already preparing for Partition, this posting seems odd, since Risalpur was outside what would become India’s borders.
In fact, the division of the armed forces didn’t start until July 1947. A short but important period earlier that year is often missed. During those months, Air Headquarters followed a clear plan to nationalise air power.
This plan was called Target ‘C’. It aimed to put all air operations, training, and maintenance under Indian control by June 1948, shaping what the Royal Indian Air Force hoped to become.
And it nearly succeeded.
From Aspiration to Hard Reality
After the Second World War ended, India’s air forces had to shrink. The main question was how to shape their future structure.
At first, planners thought India needed a balanced garrison force of about twenty operational squadrons for post-war security. This plan, called Target ‘A’, included both RAF and RIAF units, with RAF squadrons gradually leaving as Indian forces grew.
That idea didn’t last. In November 1946, the Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee was established to find a way to nationalise India’s armed forces quickly. The committee was led by Gopalaswamy Ayyangar and included H. N. Kunzru, Mohammad Ismail, Sampuran Singh, three senior Indian officers, and one senior British officer.
One of the committee’s first decisions was that RAF operational units would return to Britain soon. Plans had to be scaled back. The result was a ten-squadron RIAF force that still relied on RAF technical and administrative support. This was called Target ‘B’.
Target ‘B’ looked Indian on the surface, but its core structure was still British. The RAF continued to handle technical supervision, logistics, training, and much of the administration.
By March 1947, even this compromise wasn’t enough. The committee decided that complete nationalisation had to be carried out quickly. Air Headquarters was told to plan for complete Indian control by June 1948. This meant dropping both Target ‘A’ and Target ‘B’ and moving forward without RAF involvement, focusing on what was truly possible.
This led to Target ‘C’. It was described as a basic operational force, intended to maintain capabilities without overloading manpower or infrastructure.
Built on Spanners, Not Squadrons
One of the clearest things in the Target ‘C’ papers is their honesty about what really limited the force. It wasn’t a lack of aircraft or trained aircrew. The real issue was technical manpower.
On paper, the Royal Indian Air Force in early 1947 seemed to have good numbers. But those numbers hid a big problem: there weren’t enough Group I tradesmen, experienced NCOs, or technical officers to keep large-scale flying operations going. This shortage influenced every decision that followed.
As a result, planners abandoned squadron numbers as the primary planning metric. Instead, the entire force was designed around a fixed ceiling of 1,920 aircraft flying hours per month. This figure represented the maximum effort that the available technical manpower could sustain without breaking down.
This number became the main guide for Target ‘C’. Aircraft numbers, squadron sizes, and deployment plans were all based on it. Instead of a top-down approach, the force was now built from the ground up.
Designing Backwards From Reality
With the flying-hour limit set, the rest of the force structure followed. Fighters and transports were given usage rates that balanced their value with how much maintenance they needed. Fighters could fly twenty hours per month each, and transports thirty-two. This worked out to a force of sixty-four fighters and twenty transports.
Even with these limits, planners wanted to keep ten squadrons, though each would be smaller. They saw squadrons as holders of trained people, operational habits, and shared experience. Disbanding them would have destroyed the foundation needed for future growth.
To make this work, squadrons had to get smaller. Fighter squadrons dropped to eight aircraft each, about half their pre-war size. Transport squadrons went from twenty aircraft to ten. These smaller units freed up people for training, repair, and equipment depots.
Even after these cuts, the shortage of technical staff remained the biggest problem. Planners knew experience couldn’t be created overnight, and just adding more people wouldn’t help. So, about 400 additional Group II tradesmen were selected to be retrained as Group I tradesmen at the Technical Ground Training School. The Central Trade Test Board also looked for experienced airmen who could switch to technical roles without full retraining.
For pilots, the main challenge was type conversion. Basic flying training was mostly Indian-run, but squadrons couldn’t handle conversion training by themselves. Target ‘C’ suggested creating a Conversion Training Unit (CTU) with thirty-two Tempests, eight Dakotas and eight Harvards. The training path was being set up: basic flying at Jodhpur, advanced training at Ambala, and type conversion at the CTU in Agra.
Redistributing manpower was the final step. Officers who had been released from earlier roles were assigned to staff positions at Air Headquarters, Group Headquarters, and Station Headquarters after completing basic staff training.
The force’s limits were openly admitted. The nationalised air force planned for June 1948 wouldn’t be able to defend against a strong enemy. It had no reconnaissance, bomber, or air observation units. Air support for the army was basic, and transport shortages limited help for civil authorities. Expeditionary missions were only possible in peaceful situations.
Drawing the Force on the Map
With force size and training pipelines defined, Target ‘C’ turned to deployment. It retained eight fighter squadrons, each at an establishment of eight aircraft, and two transport squadrons, each at an establishment of ten aircraft. The fighter force was distributed across four operational stations: Risalpur, Peshawar, Poona, and Ranchi. The two transport squadrons were separated geographically but integrated operationally at Chaklala and Palam, following a brief interim stint at Mauripur.
The fighter fleet was centred on a single aircraft type, the Hawker Tempest, as the Spitfires were already on their way out. At this point, the Royal Indian Air Force operated three Tempest squadrons. A nationalised air force could not afford the training burden, spares holdings, and maintenance complexity associated with multiple fighter types.
Operational control was equally compact. All flying units were placed under a single operational formation, No. 1 Group. No. 1 Group had been based at Peshawar since 1928 and was intended to move to Lahore under this organisation. No. 2 Group, based at Bangalore, was responsible for everything that did not fly: maintenance, logistics, and ground training.
Air Headquarters, located in Delhi, retained direct oversight. It incorporated Records, Medical and Accounts, a Signals Centre, and Provost functions. An Air Headquarters Communication Flight, equipped with four Harvards, was to operate from Palam or Willingdon.
The key to this deployment was the built-in conversion plan. Each fighter base would have one fully converted Tempest squadron to help convert the second squadron at the same base. This way, conversion flying could continue without hurting operations elsewhere, and there was less need to move aircraft around or use those kept in storage.
At Peshawar, Nos. 1 and 9 Squadrons were to convert onto Tempests transferred from RAF No. 5 Squadron, with RAF responsibility retained during conversion. At Risalpur, No. 3 Squadron was to arrive with a full Tempest complement, retain eight aircraft, and transfer eight to No. 7 Squadron for local conversion under No. 3 Squadron’s supervision. At Poona, No. 8 Squadron was to move in from Kolar, already Tempest-equipped, and act as the conversion anchor for No. 2 Squadron. At Ranchi, No. 10 Squadron was to move in from Barrackpore and redistribute aircraft to No. 4 Squadron returning from overseas service.
Chaklala was designated to host one transport squadron, alongside the Parachute Training School. The second transport squadron was to be based at Palam, co-located with headquarters elements. This was to be achieved by splitting No. 12 Squadron, with one flight transferred to form No. 6 Squadron. The former was to be based at Chaklala, while the latter would operate from Mauripur during conversion before moving on to Palam.
Target ‘C’ in Action (April–May 1947)
The AOC-in-C approved Target C in April 1947, and it was put into action right away with squadron moves, aircraft conversions, and new postings.
The first movement followed in April 1947, when No. 3 Squadron shifted from Kolar to Risalpur, arriving already equipped with Tempests. Its sixteen aircraft allowed it to retain eight for its own establishment while earmarking eight for No. 7 Squadron, which came from Kohat after shedding its Spitfires. In line with nationalisation, Wing Commander Arjan Singh was posted from Kohat to take over as Station Commander, Risalpur.
At Poona, No. 8 Squadron moved from Kolar to Poona in May 1947. No. 2 Squadron, which remained at Poona, converted from Spitfire to Tempest using aircraft transferred from No. 8. Wing Commander H. S. Ratnagar assumed command of the station in the same month.
Also in May, two parallel conversions were initiated at Peshawar. No. 1 Squadron moved from Yelahanka to Peshawar and began converting from Spitfire to Tempest. Almost simultaneously, No. 9 Squadron moved from Bhopal to Peshawar for the same purpose. Both units drew their Tempests from RAF No. 5 Squadron. Peshawar was to be handed over to Indian command once RAF No. 5 Squadron vacated the station.
Ranchi followed next. In early May 1947, the airfield was closed for repairs, and Kanpur was designated as a temporary substitute. No. 10 Squadron moved from Barrackpore to Kanpur with its Tempests in mid-May. No. 4 Squadron, returning from service in Japan, arrived only in early August 1947.
Transport reorganisation proceeded in parallel. On 1 May 1947, No. 6 Squadron was formed at Mauripur with ten Dakota aircraft drawn from No. 12 Squadron. No. 12 Squadron relocated to Chaklala alongside the Parachute Training School.
Nationalisation also impacted senior command. On 15 May 1947, Subroto Mukerjee was promoted to Air Commodore and appointed Deputy AOA at Air Headquarters. Group Captain Aspy Engineer was posted as head of the Personnel Directorate. Wing Commander Narendra was promoted to Group Captain and posted as SOA of No. 2 Group at Bangalore. Wing Commander Mehar Singh was promoted to Group Captain and posted to Air Headquarters in charge of Training. These moves triggered a cascade of secondary adjustments across the service.
By the end of May 1947, Target ‘C’ seems to have been fully carried out. The only thing left was the gradual departure of RAF personnel, which was set to continue until June 1948.
When Politics Overran Planning (July 1947)
By June 1947, Partition was clearly on the way. The Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee replaced the Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee. The carefully planned nationalisation now ran into the reality of dividing land and resources.
On 30 June 1947, the Armed Forces Reconstruction Committee was constituted to oversee the division of the armed forces. Its Air Force sub-committee met repeatedly through July to determine how squadrons, aircraft, stations, and personnel would be apportioned between India and Pakistan. The decisions that followed cut directly across the assumptions embedded in Target ‘C’.
The first problem was geography. Some stations meant to be permanent under Target ‘C’ were now outside India. Peshawar, Risalpur, and Chaklala would no longer be Royal Indian Air Force bases. The planned network of fighter and transport bases couldn’t survive this change.
The second fracture was operational. Although No. 6 Squadron had already been formed through the division of No. 12 Squadron, its future course changed decisively. What had been conceived as internal rebalancing now became part of the division of assets between two successor services.
Command plans also fell apart. The planned move of No. 1 Group from Peshawar to Lahore didn’t happen. Instead, No. 1 Group became the Royal Pakistan Air Force’s headquarters, leaving the Royal Indian Air Force without a Group HQ to manage operations.
To minimise disruption, it was decided that squadrons already based at Peshawar would remain with Pakistan, while units at Poona and Kanpur would remain with India. This left India needing to relocate Nos. 3 and 7 Squadrons from Risalpur and No. 12 Squadron from Chaklala. In a memorandum dated 28 July 1947, AVM Perry-Keene, Chairman of the Air Force Committee, noted that a suitable Indian base had yet to be identified. All Target ‘C’ bases within India were already fully occupied.
The Agra detour
Clues to the search for an alternate base appear in the logbooks of Air Marshal Shivdev Singh, then commanding No. 12 Squadron at Chaklala. In early August 1947, he recorded several reconnaissance trips to Agra.
Agra’s relevance was already established. Under Target ‘C’, it had been earmarked to host the Conversion Training Unit and was vacant at the time. It appears that, in the days immediately preceding 15 August, planners converged on Agra as the most viable alternative. Palam likely proved unusable due to RAF congestion. Agra, by contrast, was empty and available. On 15 August 1947, No. 12 Squadron moved to Agra.
The Risalpur element of Target ‘C’ was dismantled in parallel. No. 7 Squadron moved to Agra. No. 3 Squadron moved to Poona on 14 August 1947. Group Captain Arjan Singh left Risalpur the same day to take over command at Ambala.
Agra was a solution for basing, but not for command HQ. Under Target ‘C’, No. 2 Group, responsible for training and maintenance, was intended to move to Agra. That move never occurred, and the Group remained at Bangalore. Agra lay deep within undivided India, but in a divided subcontinent, it was no longer centrally placed.
Making Sense of the Aftermath
The way Target ‘C’ was carried out, right before Partition, helps explain many old mysteries. Moves, postings, and decisions that once seemed sudden or random now show a clear pattern.
It shows why the Royal Indian Air Force suddenly became almost entirely Tempest-based fighter force in 1947, with squadrons running at half their usual size. In this context, it also makes sense that Spitfires and even Harvards were used in operational squadrons after Independence.
It also explains the rushed squadron moves in summer 1947. These were part of a planned conversion and deployment that Partition disrupted. This view also helps us see why Agra, by chance, became the new base for transport units and the Parachute Training School after Partition, taking over from Chaklala.
Target ‘C’ further reveals a new insight. Risalpur was the first RIAF operational station, followed by Poona in May 1947. Before the remaining stations envisaged under Target ‘C’ could be nationalised, Partition brought the process to a halt.
The decision to send Nos. 1, 6, and 9 Squadrons to Pakistan also makes more sense now. Under Target ‘C’, these units were already based in areas that became part of Pakistan, so the split required little relocation. In reality, only squadrons at Peshawar (Nos. 1 and 9) or Risalpur (Nos. 3 and 7) could have stayed with the Royal Pakistan Air Force. Since Risalpur became the RPAF training base, Nos. 1 and 9 went to Pakistan, while Nos. 3 and 7 returned to India. The Indian Air Force later raised its own Nos. 1, 6, and 9 Squadrons, but that’s another story.
Target ‘C’ also explains why, at Partition, Nos. 4 and 10 Squadrons were both at Kanpur, even though Kanpur wasn’t meant to be a permanent fighter base. This happened because they were originally supposed to be paired at Ranchi, which was undergoing repairs.
The story of the Conversion Training Unit is similar. The CTU was never set up as planned because RAF No. 5 Squadron didn’t move to Agra. Tempests were only used for conversion training in 1949, first at Ambala, then at Hakimpet in 1951. Transport conversion was also delayed. The CTU for Dakotas took longer, but a Conversion and Training Squadron was finally formed at Agra in 1948, though it started with Oxford aircraft.
Finally, Target ‘C’ helps explain senior command decisions that might seem early. The promotion of senior RIAF officers in May 1947, such as Subroto Mukerjee becoming Air Commodore and Deputy AOA, occurred before the final force split for Partition. These moves were part of the nationalisation plan in Target ‘C’, meant to put command in Indian hands.
The Royal Indian Air Force that emerged after Independence still showed signs of Target ‘C’ in its structure and thinking. It also bore the scars of a nationalisation process that was stopped halfway. This break helps explain why, when tensions with Pakistan rose again in 1950, the RIAF quickly started Plan Shikar to add more aircraft, squadrons, radars, and stations.
Target C has hitherto remained the unknown foundation stone upon which the Indian Air Force has been built stone by stone, layer by layer. Maybe it’s time we unravelled the sands of time to give it its place in the sun
Key Sources:
“Target C”, 601/13492/H at MoD History Division
“Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee”, 601/13494/H at MoD History Division
Monthly Record Books for the period of 1947 for all the squadrons, stations and units
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