Exploring the riveting history of the Indo-Pak wars, this thread delves into the remarkable tales of resilience and technological rivalry shown by three pivotal radar installations at Sakesar, Badin, and Amritsar. These facilities are testaments to the relentless pursuit of air defence superiority across the Radcliffe line.
As World War II drew to a close in 1945, the British government made a fateful decision to dismantle its radar defences, deeming such advanced technology unnecessary for the Indian Air Force (IAF). This choice left the newly partitioned IAF and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in a precarious position, devoid of crucial ‘eyes in the sky.’ This sparked a frenzied race to establish air surveillance capabilities, underlining the urgency and competition of the situation.
Modelling its air defence on the British system, the IAF’s radar network in 1962 comprised a modest fleet: one Type 8 radar, six T-13 radars, seven T-14 radars, and ten T-15 radars. This limited setup offered scant defence depth, exposing vulnerabilities in India’s air defence infrastructure.
However, the PAF took a different path under the 1954 U.S. aid program, embracing American technology. By 1962, the PAF had erected two crucial radar stations equipped with FPS-20 units and the FPS-6 height finder at Sakesar in the northern sector and Badin in the southern sector. These installations swiftly became the bedrock of Pakistan’s air defence infrastructure, illustrating a strategic divergence in technological adoption between the two nations.
The 1962 conflict exposed the inadequacies of the IAF’s radar capabilities and drew closer ties with the United States. In November 1963, the joint Indo-US exercise “Ex–Shiksha” was launched to explore deeper cooperation. During this initiative, the USAF deployed two mobile radar units, the MPS-11 and MPS-16, at Patiala (311 SU) and Rampurhat (411 SU). These units were as mobile and capable as the stationary FPS-20s used by the PAF.
To bolster its radar network, the IAF approved the induction of six American Star Sapphire units (500 SU series) equipped with FPS-89 and FPS-100 radars alongside twelve Soviet P-30 units (200 SU series). The FPS-100 served as a surveillance radar, while the FPS-89 was tasked with height finding, offering significant enhancements over the PAF’s FPS-6/20 systems.
However, by the time the 1965 war erupted, the IAF had only managed to operationalise two P-30s and one Star Sapphire unit. One of these P-30 units, stationed at 230 SU in Amritsar, proved especially critical. It could peer deep into Pakistani territory and was nicknamed “Fish Oil” or “Target Alpha,” placing it high on the PAF’s list of strategic targets.
Located approximately 100 km northwest of Sargodha in the Soan Valley, the Sakesar peak, standing at an elevation of 4,992 feet, was strategically chosen by the PAF as its Sector Operations Center. By 1961, this centre was operational with the advanced American FPS-20/6 radar system. From its vantage point, Sakesar provided comprehensive coverage over the northern region, monitoring key IAF bases such as Amritsar, Adampur, Pathankot, and Halwara.
Meanwhile, the PAF established another Sector Operations Centre at Badin in Sindh, approximately 30 km from the international border. Equipped with the highly effective FPS-6 radar, boasting an impressive range of 350 km, Badin played a pivotal role in tracking aerial movements towards critical airfields at Bhuj, Jamnagar, Uttarlai, and Jaisalmer, thereby directing fighter operations with utmost precision and effectiveness.
The Soviet-made P-30 radar held a distinct advantage over the FPS-20: its mobility. Unlike the fixed FPS-20, typically housed under massive domes, the P-30’s large lattice and dish aerials were more adaptable and could be relocated and concealed easily. This flexibility would prove crucial in the evolving dynamics of aerial warfare.
The PAF faced significant tactical limitations due to Pakistan’s geography, which required positioning air bases within approximately 90 nautical miles (11 minutes of flying time) from potential enemy action. This proximity and inadequate low-level radar coverage that left large gaps for enemy exploitation underscored the strategic necessity of neutralizing the Amritsar radar.
On September 6, 1965, the PAF undertook missions with RB-57 Canberra aircraft to determine the exact location of the mobile radar unit, an effort that remained challenging throughout the conflict. Despite these difficulties, the CO of 230 SU, Dandapani, adeptly managed his resources. He directed aircraft operations and frequently relocated his radar unit, enhancing its survivability.
Throughout the war, the PAF launched 29 missions against the “Fish Oil” radar using F-86s, F-104s, and RB-57s equipped with guns, rockets, and napalm. However, the radar continued to operate effectively. In one notable engagement, intense anti-aircraft fire heavily damaged an RB-57, and on September 11, a four-aircraft Sabre attack resulted in the fatal downing of Squadron Leader Muniruddin Ahmad.
Moreover, the first claimed air-to-air kill of free India on September 3, 1965, can be partially attributed to the strategic guidance provided by 230 SU, which directed pilots amidst the chaos. This unit played a crucial role in most of the approximately 15 air-to-air kills claimed by the IAF in the Western sector during the war.
Initially, the IAF did not target the critical radar installations at Sakesar or Badin; instead, it focused on other strategic objectives. Despite an audacious raid on the Sargodha complex on September 6, which was heavily defended and supported by the Sakesar radar, the IAF refrained from striking it directly.
As the conflict neared its end, on September 19, the IAF’s 5 Squadron made a daring attempt to fly Canberras out of Agra. The mission was nearly suicidal—a daylight raid deep into Pakistani territory. Unfortunately, due to a malfunctioning drop tank on Squadron Leader P. Gautam’s aircraft, the two-aircraft mission had to be aborted after over half an hour inside Pakistani airspace.
The urgency to target Badin increased following aggressive PAF actions supported by its radar, including relentless attacks on Bhuj. The situation escalated when a PAF Sabre downed an Indian civilian Beechcraft within Indian airspace on September 18. This incident fast-tracked the decision to strike Badin.
On September 21, the mission to neutralise Badin was assigned to 16 Squadron, led by the legendary Pete Wilson. Flying without fighter escorts and employing a decoy strategy, Wilson executed a low-altitude attack, flying just 30 feet above ground level. He successfully destroyed the radar’s F-6 dome with a rocket, effectively disabling the Badin radar installation.
Post-1965 War, India and Pakistan escalated efforts to enhance their radar capabilities. In Pakistan, while upgrades were made to the Badin radar station to include the FPX-89/100 and later the TPS-43G with a 450 km range, Sakesar remained unchanged. Additionally, Pakistan built fake radar sites as decoys to confuse enemy targeting.
In India, the IAF swiftly operationalized its P-30s and Star Sapphire units within two years after the war, significantly improving its radar coverage and gaining a tactical advantage over the PAF. Despite these enhancements, the PAF continued its attempts to disrupt the Amritsar radar station during the 1971 conflict.
The resilience of the IAF’s 230 Signal Unit was notable. It remained operational and was instrumental in several defensive successes, including the downing of PAF pilot Amjad Hussain, who was on his third attempt to disable the 230 SU. Hussain was subsequently captured, adding a dramatic chapter to the unit’s history.
On December 5, 1971, IAF’s No. 20 and 27 Squadrons launched a targeted attack on the Sakesar radar. Although they successfully knocked out the radar for three days, the operation had significant costs. The attacking aircraft were engaged by the F-6s of No. 25 Squadron of the PAF, which shot down two of the Indian aircraft. A third, piloted by Squadron Leader Jal Mistry, was intercepted and downed by two Mirages, demonstrating the high stakes and fierce aerial combat between the two sides.
The FPS-20 Radar and FPS-6 antennae at Sakesar suffered significant damage during the raid. The raid destroyed electronic equipment and cabling, rendering the radar non-operational for three days. A pilot involved in the raid later detailed this intense operation in this interview.
In the southern sector, on the evening of December 4, IAF’s 122 Squadron carried out a stealthy attack on Badin. This strike effectively destroyed the antenna’s aerial head and damaged the powerhouse and fuel stores. Despite these setbacks, the Badin radar was partially disabled and resumed operations with reduced capabilities after just one day
A subsequent mission on December 13 saw Wing Commander HS Gill, CO of 47 Squadron, lead a four-aircraft strike from Jamnagar in a MiG-21 FL, repeating his effort from the previous day. Tragically, during this attack, his aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire, leading to his death, while the other members of his squadron managed to return safely. Badin, though targeted, continued to operate.
This thread honours the memory of the controllers, crew, technicians, and anti-aircraft crews who diligently operated these critical radar stations and the courageous pilots who attacked these well-defended sites, often at significant personal risk. Their collective bravery and sacrifices in the face of formidable defences underscore a substantial chapter in aerial combat history.
Originally published on Twitter
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