No. 2 Squadron IAF: The Eight-Year Journey to Formation

The Indian Air Force’s first squadron was formed in April 1933, but it was not until April 1941 that the second squadron came into existence. This inordinate delay of eight years was the result of several factors, including a lack of planning, foresight, and resources. Beyond these practical challenges, the decision to raise No. 2 Squadron, IAF, and its deliberations make for fascinating reading. The idea to raise No. 2 Squadron emerged as a direct response to pressing defence needs and strategic considerations within the British Empire, and it required months of negotiations between the government of India, the air ministry, and the India office.

Chatfield Report

The Air Forces in India remained relatively stable at about eight squadrons throughout the 1930s, one of which was the IAF’s No. 1 Squadron. Toward the end of the 1930s, concerns about coastal defence led to the establishment of an IAF Volunteer Reserve comprising five flights specifically for this purpose. These flights were raised in 1940, yet there were no immediate plans to raise a second IAF squadron.

Amid the growing concerns about World War II, the Chatfield Committee was tasked with reviewing India’s defence requirements. Chatfield chaired the Expert Committee, using the work of the 1938 Auchinleck Committee, recommended that the arena of India’s defence should be re-focussed more on her sea communications and less on her North-Western Land Frontier as well as the modernisation of the British Indian Army, the re-equipment of the RAF squadrons and the re-stocking of war stores.

Chapter VII of its report emphasised the need for three Army Co-operation and four Bomber squadrons as the minimum requirement to ensure the internal and external security of the subcontinent. Additionally, it recommended two more bomber squadrons for external defence. Meeting these recommendations, however, was a formidable challenge. At the time, India’s air forces were woefully under-resourced in terms of aircraft and personnel. On the Army Co-operation side, India had No. 20 and No. 28 RAF Squadrons and two partially complete squadrons: No. 5 RAF Squadron and No. 1 IAF Squadron.

The country had only two bomber squadrons—No. 27 and No. 60 RAF Squadrons—one of which was primarily used to train the coast defence flights. Two additional RAF bomber squadrons—No. 11 and No. 39— initially in India had been redeployed to Singapore, leaving India critically short of bomber squadrons. By early 1940, India effectively had only one operational bomber squadron against a requirement of six. The dire shortage begged the need for urgent action.

The Government of India Proposes a Solution

Frustrated by repeated but unfulfilled requests to the Air Ministry in the UK to transfer RAF bomber squadrons to India, the Government of India decided to take matters into its own hands. On 6 March 1940, it formally proposed a phased approach to address the shortfall. The proposal emphasised accelerating the completion of No. 1 Squadron, IAF, to full strength, allowing it to take over the No. 5 Army Co-operation Squadron RAF role. Simultaneously, No. 5 Squadron RAF would be reorganised into a light bomber squadron, eventually converting it into a medium bomber squadron. This plan would achieve three objectives: fulfil the requirement of three Army Co-operation squadrons, form a fully operational IAF squadron, and free up No. 5 RAF Squadron to serve as a dedicated bomber squadron.

Crucially, the proposal also included the formation of No. 2 Squadron, IAF, as a bomber squadron—the fourth bomber squadron needed for India’s defence. The Government of India argued that this approach would not only address the immediate shortage of bomber squadrons but also enhance the prestige and capabilities of the Indian Air Force. Their argument rested on three key points: first, the successful development of No. 1 Squadron, IAF, had exceeded expectations, demonstrating the competence of Indian personnel; second, forming another squadron under the Indian banner would lower recurring costs compared to maintaining an RAF squadron; and third, such a move would foster national pride and align with broader political goals of increasing Indian participation in defence. Additionally, trained personnel from No. 1 Squadron could form the nucleus for No. 2 Squadron, ensuring continuity and leveraging existing expertise.

The discussions surrounding the formation of No. 2 Squadron also highlighted broader considerations about the development of the Indian Air Force. The Government of India recognised that raising a second squadron would provide significant opportunities for promotion and advancement within the IAF, thereby boosting morale and encouraging recruitment. The personnel training for the new squadron was planned at existing facilities in India and supplemented by overseas training arrangements where necessary. It was anticipated that the formation of No. 2 Squadron would take up to 18 months, with the immediate provision of new aircraft not being critical, as personnel training would take precedence.

Air Ministry Responds

The Air Ministry, however, had some reservations about the Government of India’s proposal. In April 1940, it countered with an alternative approach, arguing that No. 2 Squadron, IAF, should be raised as an Army Co-operation Squadron rather than a bomber squadron. The Air Ministry’s reasoning was twofold. First, training personnel for a bomber squadron would require significantly more time and resources, particularly given the shift to twin-engine bombers as standard equipment. Second, bomber squadrons needed almost twice the ground staff of Army Co-operation squadrons, further complicating recruitment and training logistics.

The Air Ministry proposed that raising No. 2 IAF Squadron as an Army Co-operation unit would allow one of the existing RAF Army Co-operation squadrons—either No. 20 or No. 28—to be converted into a bomber squadron, thereby meeting the immediate needs outlined by the Chatfield Report. This plan, they argued, would expedite the process of achieving the required number of bomber squadrons while bolstering India’s internal defence capabilities. The Air Ministry further emphasised that this plan would not preclude the eventual reinforcement of India’s air forces by additional RAF bomber squadrons, should the need arise.

A Hiccup

These deliberations were disrupted when, in April 1940, No. 11 and No. 60 RAF Squadrons were redeployed to India from Singapore. Their return prompted the Air Ministry to question whether raising No. 2 Squadron, IAF, was still necessary. However, this concern was thankfully short-lived. By June 1940, both squadrons were redeployed again, this time to Aden, leaving India once more critically short of bomber squadrons.

No. 2 IAF Squadron is raised

Ultimately, pragmatism prevailed, and it was decided to raise No. 2 Squadron, IAF, as an Army Co-operation Squadron. On 1 April 1941, the squadron was formally established, with a nucleus of officers and personnel drawn from No. 1 Squadron, IAF, including the Westland Wapiti aircraft. Over the next 12 months, the necessary training and recruitment efforts were undertaken, leading to its operational readiness, and it saw action in 1942 in Burma.

As part of the broader restructuring, No. 5 Squadron RAF transitioned to a light bomber role on the Hawker Hart in June 1940. However, the plan to convert either No. 20 or No. 28 RAF Squadron to a bomber role did not materialise. Both squadrons continued operating in the Army Co-operation role on the Westland Lysander into early 1942, as did No. 1 Squadron, IAF. The chronic shortage of bomber squadrons persisted. It was left to the innovation of Jumbo Majumdar as Commanding Officer of No. 1 Squadron’s use of Lysanders for bombing missions in Burma, the first time an IAF squadron played such a role.